The Interim Leadership Council's contradictions reveal a state fracturing under fire
Executive Summary
- Iran's three-man Interim Leadership Council is visibly split: President Pezeshkian apologized to Gulf neighbors for Iranian strikes, while judiciary chief Mohseni-Ejei vowed attacks would intensify — and the IRGC continued firing regardless of either statement.
- The Revolutionary Guard, which answered exclusively to the late Supreme Leader Khamenei, now operates without effective civilian control, choosing its own targets as the war enters its second week.
- This governance vacuum — not external military pressure — may prove the most destabilizing factor for Iran's survival as a coherent state, with senior clerics urgently calling for the Assembly of Experts to convene and elect a new supreme leader even as its buildings are bombed.
Chapter 1: The Apology That Wasn't
On Saturday, March 7, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appeared on state television in what observers described as a hastily filmed, unprofessional broadcast. Without the usual trappings of presidential authority, he delivered a message that would have been unthinkable a week earlier: an apology to Iran's neighbors.
"I should apologize to the neighboring countries that were attacked by Iran, on my own behalf," Pezeshkian said. "From now on, they should not attack neighboring countries or fire missiles at them, unless we are attacked by those countries. I think we should solve this through diplomacy."
The statement was remarkable for several reasons. First, Iran has never in its post-revolutionary history apologized for military action. Second, the phrasing — "on my own behalf" — implicitly acknowledged that the president does not speak for the entire Iranian state. Third, and most damning, Iranian missiles and drones continued striking Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia hours after the apology was broadcast.
The disconnect was not a failure of communication. It was a structural revelation: the Islamic Republic's post-Khamenei governance architecture is fundamentally broken.
Chapter 2: The Three-Headed State
Under Iran's constitution, when the Supreme Leader dies or becomes incapacitated, an Interim Leadership Council assumes the functions of head of state until the Assembly of Experts elects a successor. The current council consists of three men with radically different temperaments, constituencies, and visions for Iran's future:
Masoud Pezeshkian (President): A reformist surgeon from Tabriz, elected in 2024 on a platform of economic pragmatism and diplomatic engagement. An ethnic Azeri with no military background, he represents Iran's civilian political establishment. His instinct is de-escalation.
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei (Judiciary Chief): A hardline cleric and former intelligence minister sanctioned by the EU for human rights violations. A staunch Khamenei loyalist, he publicly contradicted Pezeshkian within hours, posting on X: "The geography of some countries in the region — both overtly and covertly — is in the hands of the enemy, and those points are used against our country in acts of aggression. Intense attacks on these targets will continue."
Ayatollah Alireza Arafi (Acting Head of Seminaries): A conservative cleric serving as the third member, whose public positioning has been minimal, leaving the council effectively deadlocked between Pezeshkian's pragmatism and Mohseni-Ejei's maximalism.
The key structural problem is that none of these three men command the loyalty of the institution that actually controls Iran's war: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Chapter 3: The IRGC's Autonomous War
The IRGC operated under a unique constitutional arrangement: it answered exclusively to the Supreme Leader, bypassing the president, parliament, and regular military chain of command. With Khamenei dead, this arrangement has created a power vacuum that no institutional mechanism was designed to fill.
The Guard's senior leadership — including commander-in-chief Hossein Salami and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani — now faces an unprecedented situation. They have no Supreme Leader to take orders from, no established protocol for civilian oversight, and a war to fight.
Evidence suggests the IRGC is operating autonomously. When Pezeshkian apologized for strikes on Gulf states, General Abolfazl Shekarchi, Iran's armed forces spokesman, offered a contradictory statement claiming Tehran had "not hit countries that did not provide space for America to invade our country." This was factually false — the U.S. strikes have not been launched from Gulf Arab territories — but it revealed the military's separate narrative from the civilian leadership.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard general, further muddied the waters by declaring that defense policies remained "in line with the late supreme leader's guidance" — effectively invoking the dead leader's authority to override the living president.
The result is a military force conducting its own strategic campaign while the civilian government simultaneously tries to conduct diplomacy. Iran is speaking with multiple voices because it genuinely has multiple power centers, and the mechanism that unified them — the Supreme Leader — no longer exists.
Chapter 4: Historical Precedents for Headless States at War
The phenomenon of a state losing its apex leader during wartime is rare but not unprecedented. Each historical case offers insights into Iran's likely trajectory:
Imperial Japan, August 1945: After the atomic bombings, Emperor Hirohito personally intervened to break a deadlock in the Supreme War Council between "peace" and "war" factions. Without an equivalent figure in Iran, the deadlock persists. The Iranian system was designed with a Supreme Leader precisely to prevent such paralysis — but the war destroyed the person filling that role before the system was tested.
Egypt, October 1981: When Anwar Sadat was assassinated, Vice President Hosni Mubarak assumed power within hours. Egypt's simpler presidential system allowed a clean transition. Iran's system, requiring a deliberative body (the Assembly of Experts) to select a new leader, cannot match this speed — especially when that body's meeting places are under aerial bombardment.
The Soviet Union, March 1953: Stalin's death created a power struggle among Beria, Malenkov, and Khrushchev that took years to resolve. But critically, the USSR was not simultaneously fighting a war against external powers. Iran faces the worst-case scenario: internal power fragmentation during active military conflict.
| Case | Transition Time | At War? | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan 1945 | Days (Emperor intervened) | Yes | Surrender, orderly transition |
| Egypt 1981 | Hours | No | Seamless military succession |
| USSR 1953 | ~3 years | No (Cold War only) | Collective leadership → Khrushchev |
| Iran 2026 | Ongoing (Day 8) | Yes (active bombardment) | Fractured authority, IRGC autonomy |
The closest parallel may actually be Iraq in April 2003, when Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed and multiple power centers — Baathist remnants, tribal leaders, religious authorities, and militias — competed for authority simultaneously. The difference is that Iran's institutions remain nominally intact; they simply cannot agree on who commands whom.
Chapter 5: The Assembly of Experts Dilemma
Prominent cleric Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi issued a public statement urging the Assembly of Experts to act quickly. "The timely realization of this important matter will lead to national authority and the best possible organization of affairs," he said.
The 88-member Assembly faces extraordinary logistical challenges:
- Physical destruction: Buildings associated with the Assembly have been hit by airstrikes, presumably targeted precisely to prevent convening.
- Communications blackout: Iran's internet has been largely shut down, complicating coordination among clerics dispersed across the country.
- Security: Any gathering of senior clerics is a high-value target. Israel and the U.S. have demonstrated the ability to strike leadership targets with precision.
- Political divisions: The Assembly must choose between Mojtaba Khamenei (the late leader's son, backed by IRGC hardliners), a compromise candidate, or attempting an entirely new governance model.
Every day without a new Supreme Leader deepens the structural crisis. The IRGC grows more autonomous, the civilian government's statements become less credible internationally, and the gap between Iran's diplomatic signals and military actions widens.
Chapter 6: Scenario Analysis
Scenario A: Rapid Supreme Leader Selection (20%)
Premise: The Assembly of Experts manages to convene within days and selects Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader, consolidating IRGC support.
Trigger conditions: Assembly members gather at an undisclosed location; IRGC provides security; Mojtaba secures enough votes through wartime rallying effect.
Historical precedent: In 1989, the Assembly selected Khamenei as Supreme Leader within hours of Khomeini's death — but Iran was not under active bombardment then.
Probability rationale: The 20% estimate reflects the extreme difficulty of convening 88 clerics under active aerial bombardment, with destroyed infrastructure and communications blackout. The 1989 precedent showed speed is possible, but conditions were incomparably more permissive. Israeli intelligence is likely monitoring any large gathering of senior clerics.
Implications: Would restore unified command but likely escalate the war, as Mojtaba would need to demonstrate authority through military assertiveness.
Scenario B: Prolonged Vacuum and De Facto IRGC Rule (50%)
Premise: The Assembly cannot convene for weeks or months. The IRGC gradually assumes de facto state authority, with the Interim Leadership Council reduced to a diplomatic fig leaf.
Trigger conditions: Continued bombardment prevents Assembly convening; IRGC commanders consolidate control over war strategy, economic management, and internal security.
Historical precedent: Pakistan's military has repeatedly assumed state authority during crises, maintaining civilian facades while controlling strategic decisions. Egypt under SCAF (2011-2012) similarly operated with nominal civilian participation but actual military control.
Probability rationale: This is the default trajectory if nothing changes. The IRGC already controls vast economic assets (estimated 20-40% of GDP), commands the most capable military forces, and has operational autonomy. The 50% probability reflects both the inertia of the current situation and the IRGC's institutional capacity to fill governance vacuums. Five of the last seven major Iranian crises have resulted in IRGC power expansion.
Implications: Creates a military-theocratic hybrid state more opaque and unpredictable than the previous system. International diplomacy becomes harder as interlocutors cannot determine who holds real authority.
Scenario C: Negotiated Ceasefire Under Pezeshkian's Authority (30%)
Premise: Pezeshkian leverages his constitutional position and international recognition to negotiate directly with the U.S. or through intermediaries, marginalizing IRGC hardliners.
Trigger conditions: War exhaustion mounts; IRGC missile stockpiles deplete further (already 90% reduced capacity); Gulf states offer mediation in exchange for ceasefire; Qatar and Oman facilitate back-channel talks.
Historical precedent: The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988 when Khomeini accepted UNSC Resolution 598, which he called "drinking poison." Even the Supreme Leader had to bow to military reality. Without a Supreme Leader, Pezeshkian could claim similar authority if the military situation deteriorates enough.
Probability rationale: The 30% reflects several supporting factors: Reuters reported U.S.-Qatari back-channel discussions are already underway; Iran's missile capability is severely degraded (90% reduction); and Pezeshkian's apology signals genuine desire to de-escalate. However, the IRGC's institutional resistance and Trump's "unconditional surrender" demand make success uncertain. Only 2 of 8 similar wartime diplomatic overtures in the past 50 years succeeded without a change in military conditions.
Implications: Could establish civilian primacy in Iran's governance for the first time since 1979 — but at the cost of significant territorial and military concessions.
Chapter 7: Investment Implications
The governance crisis adds a layer of unpredictability beyond the direct military conflict:
Oil markets: Contradictory Iranian statements make supply disruption forecasts unreliable. If the IRGC controls targeting independently, Gulf energy infrastructure remains at risk regardless of diplomatic signals. Brent crude's current $90+ reflects this uncertainty premium.
Defense sector: Prolonged conflict with no clear Iranian negotiating authority benefits defense stocks (Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop Grumman). The $151 million new arms sale to Israel announced Saturday signals continued escalation.
Gulf sovereign wealth: UAE President MBZ's declaration that "we are now in a time of war" suggests Gulf states are shifting from defensive to confrontational posture. This could accelerate Gulf defense spending (benefiting BAE Systems, Leonardo, Thales) while pressuring Gulf real estate and tourism sectors.
Currency markets: The Iranian rial is untradeable; the more significant signal is the dollar's strengthening as a safe haven. The euro weakened on ECB repricing concerns, and the yen benefited from BOJ rate hike postponement signals.
Risk assessment: A headless Iranian state is more dangerous than a unified one. The IRGC's autonomous targeting increases the probability of a strategic miscalculation — striking a target that triggers a wider escalation (such as a direct hit on a Saudi oil processing facility or a civilian airliner). Markets should price in higher tail risk, not lower, from Pezeshkian's diplomatic overtures.
Conclusion
The paradox of Pezeshkian's apology — delivered sincerely, contradicted immediately, and rendered irrelevant by continued strikes — is not merely a diplomatic curiosity. It is the visible symptom of a constitutional crisis without precedent in the Islamic Republic's 47-year history.
Iran's system was designed around a single point of authority: the Supreme Leader. That point has been destroyed, and no institutional mechanism can replace it quickly enough to matter during an active war. The three men on the Interim Leadership Council represent three different Irans — pragmatic, hardline, and clerical — each pulling in a different direction while the IRGC fights its own war.
For the international community, this means there may be no one in Iran capable of agreeing to a ceasefire and making it stick. For Iran's 88 million citizens, it means their fate is being decided by a military force with no civilian oversight and a political leadership with no military authority.
The most dangerous state is not one with a ruthless leader. It is one with no leader at all.
Sources: AP News, NPR, DW News, CNN, NBC News, ISW/CTP, Reuters
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