A new police unit has killed 924 people in eight months — with near-total impunity. The world's fifth most populous country is building a parallel security state that threatens its nuclear-armed democracy.
Executive Summary
- Pakistan's Punjab province created the Crime Control Department (CCD) in April 2025 to fight organized crime; within eight months, it killed 924 suspects in 670 staged "encounters" — averaging more than two fatal shootings per day — while losing only two officers.
- The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) concluded on February 17, 2026 that the CCD operates a "systemic policy of extrajudicial killing," with virtually identical police narratives across hundreds of cases suggesting orchestrated state violence rather than legitimate law enforcement.
- Pakistan's descent into police-state authoritarianism — combining mass extrajudicial killings, the political imprisonment of former PM Imran Khan (now 85% blind), IMF-imposed austerity, and simultaneous insurgencies — represents a convergence of crises in a 250-million-person nuclear state that demands global attention.
Chapter 1: The Machine
On a night in November 2025, armed officers from Pakistan's Crime Control Department raided the home of Zubaida Bibi in Bahawalpur, a city in southern Punjab. They seized mobile phones, cash, gold jewelry, and her daughter's wedding dowry. They also took her sons.
Within 24 hours, five members of her family were dead — killed in separate "police encounters" across different districts. Her sons Imran, 25, Irfan, 23, and Adnan, 18, along with two sons-in-law, were all shot dead. Her husband, Abdul Jabbar, insists none had criminal records. "They were working men, married with children," he told investigators.
When Zubaida filed a legal petition, police threatened to kill whoever remained in her family if she did not withdraw it.
This is not an isolated case. It is the system working as designed.
The CCD was formally constituted in April 2025 under Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz Sharif — daughter of three-time Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and niece of current PM Shehbaz Sharif. Its stated mandate: combat serious and organized crime in a province of over 130 million people, more than half of Pakistan's population.
The results have been staggering — and deeply disturbing. According to an explosive fact-finding report published by the HRCP on February 17, 2026:
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Encounters documented | 670+ |
| Suspects killed | 924 |
| Police officers killed | 2 |
| Police officers injured | 36 |
| Period | April – December 2025 (8 months) |
| Kill rate | ~3.8 suspects killed per day |
| Casualty ratio | 462:1 (suspects to police) |
For comparison, HRCP's annual report for 2024 recorded 341 suspects killed in encounters across Punjab and Sindh combined over the entire year. The CCD, operating in a single province, more than doubled that toll in less than eight months.
Chapter 2: The Pattern
The HRCP report reveals a chilling uniformity across hundreds of cases. The script is almost always identical:
- A CCD team intercepts suspects, nearly always described as riding motorcycles and moving "suspiciously," typically at night or at a roadblock.
- The suspects allegedly react aggressively and open fire first.
- Police return fire in "self-defense."
- The suspects are killed. Weapons are recovered.
- A press release is issued with near-identical language across all districts.
This template appeared in virtually every case the HRCP reviewed. The commission concluded this "suggests orchestrated messaging rather than independent operational outcomes."
The geographic distribution of killings tells its own story. Lahore, the provincial capital, recorded 139 encounters — the highest of any district. Faisalabad followed with 55, and Sheikhupura with 47. The killed were categorized as: dacoity (armed robbery) suspects (366 deaths), robbery suspects (138), narcotics suspects (114), and murder suspects (99).
What makes these figures particularly alarming is the near-total absence of accountability mechanisms:
- No FIA investigations: Despite the Torture and Custodial Death Act 2022 mandating the Federal Investigation Agency investigate every custodial death, no evidence of mandatory investigations was found.
- No magisterial inquiries: Required under Sections 174–176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, these standard post-death inquiries appear not to have been conducted.
- Government silence: Punjab government and CCD officials refused to meet with the HRCP fact-finding mission.
- Family intimidation: Multiple families reported being pressured to bury their dead immediately and warned that pursuing legal cases would result in more killings.
Chapter 3: The Historical Context — Pakistan's Encounter Culture
Extrajudicial killings by police are not new in Pakistan. They represent a deeply entrenched pattern that dates back to the 1960s, when Punjab first developed what HRCP director Farah Zia calls "a policing culture where there was impunity for torture." The practice later spread to Sindh, where Karachi's police became notorious for staged encounters during the 1990s and 2000s.
But the CCD represents a qualitative escalation. Previous encounter killings were typically carried out by regular police units operating ad hoc, with plausible deniability. The CCD is a purpose-built institution — a "parallel police force" as the HRCP calls it — with dedicated staffing, operational autonomy, and what appears to be explicit political backing at the highest levels.
Historical comparison of Pakistan's encounter killing rates:
| Period | Province | Deaths/Year | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000s average | Sindh (Karachi) | ~200–300 | Anti-MQM, anti-gang operations |
| 2013–2018 | Punjab (CTD) | ~100–150 | Counter-terrorism operations |
| 2024 (full year) | Punjab + Sindh | 341 | Baseline before CCD |
| Apr–Dec 2025 | Punjab (CCD alone) | 924 (8 months) | "Safe Punjab" initiative |
The CCD's kill rate of approximately 1,386 per year (annualized) would place it among the most lethal police forces in the world relative to its operational scope, rivaling the worst periods of the Philippines' drug war under Rodrigo Duterte, where police killed approximately 6,000–30,000 people over six years (2016–2022).
The International Criminal Court's investigation of Duterte — with a charges confirmation hearing scheduled for February 23–27, 2026 — provides a mirror for Pakistan. The Philippines' drug war began as a "law and order" initiative that evolved into a systematic campaign of extrajudicial killing. The CCD appears to be following the same trajectory at an accelerated pace.
Chapter 4: The Broader Crisis — A Nuclear State Under Pressure
The CCD's death squads do not operate in a vacuum. They are one element of a convergence of crises that together paint a picture of a nuclear-armed state in profound distress:
1. Political imprisonment and authoritarianism. Former PM Imran Khan, Pakistan's most popular political figure, has been in prison since August 2023 and has reportedly lost 85% of his vision due to what his supporters call deliberate medical neglect. His Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party has been banned from elections, its leaders jailed, and its supporters subjected to mass detention. The February 2024 elections, widely regarded as rigged, installed the Sharif-military hybrid regime currently overseeing the CCD.
2. Economic desperation. Pakistan is on its 24th IMF bailout — the most of any country. GDP growth hovers around 2.5%, well below the rate needed to absorb 4 million young people entering the labor force annually. Exports remain at a paltry 10.4% of GDP, one of the lowest ratios among major economies. Inflation, though declining from its 2023 peak of 38%, remains in double digits. The IMF's conditions — higher taxes, reduced subsidies, energy price hikes — squeeze a population where 40% already lives below the poverty line.
3. Multi-front insurgencies. Pakistan faces simultaneous security threats:
- Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA): Launched "Operation Herof 2.0" targeting Chinese infrastructure, including the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Afghan-Pakistani border remains a warzone, with Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan.
- Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP): Carried out the devastating Islamabad Shia mosque bombing in February 2026, killing 32.
4. Nuclear implications. Pakistan possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads — more than the UK. Its military, which controls the nuclear arsenal, is deeply intertwined with the civilian government through what analysts call the "Shahbaz-Munir axis" (PM Shahbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Munir). The normalization of extrajudicial violence by state forces, combined with institutional decay, raises uncomfortable questions about command-and-control reliability in a nuclear state.
Chapter 5: Scenario Analysis
Scenario A: Institutional Correction (20%)
Premise: The HRCP report and international pressure trigger a judicial inquiry, leading to CCD reforms or dissolution.
Evidence for:
- Pakistan's superior courts have historically intervened in cases of police excess (e.g., the Rao Anwar case in Sindh, 2018)
- International scrutiny from the UN Human Rights Council review mechanism
- HRCP's call for a province-wide moratorium on encounter operations
Evidence against:
- The Punjab government refused to engage with the HRCP investigation
- Maryam Nawaz's political career is built on "Safe Punjab" as her signature initiative
- The military establishment benefits from extra-legal security mechanisms
- Pakistan's judiciary has been systematically weakened since the 2023 political crisis
Historical precedent: In 2018, Rao Anwar, a senior Sindh police officer accused of killing over 400 people in staged encounters, was arrested after the killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud sparked national outrage. However, his trial has stretched over eight years with no conviction, illustrating the limits of judicial accountability in Pakistan.
Trigger: A high-profile killing that galvanizes social media or a Supreme Court suo motu action.
Scenario B: Escalation and Normalization (55%)
Premise: The CCD model expands, is replicated in other provinces, and encounter killings become a permanent feature of Pakistani governance.
Evidence for:
- Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa already have histories of encounter killings; a "successful" Punjab model invites replication
- The military-civilian hybrid government lacks incentives to restrain security forces
- Public fatigue with rising crime creates demand-side pressure for "tough" policing
- IMF austerity undermines investment in proper criminal justice reform (forensics, prosecution, courts)
- The political opposition (PTI) is too weakened to mount effective resistance
Historical precedent: Egypt under Sisi provides a template — a military-backed government institutionalized extrajudicial killings through police and security forces, with HRW documenting over 3,000 enforced disappearances between 2015 and 2024. International condemnation had minimal effect due to Egypt's strategic importance.
Trigger: Another major terrorist attack providing justification for expanded operations.
Time frame: Already underway; full normalization within 12–18 months.
Scenario C: Systemic Breakdown (25%)
Premise: The combination of political repression, economic crisis, and security force impunity triggers a broader legitimacy crisis.
Evidence for:
- Pakistan has a history of military coups triggered by governance failures (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999)
- Imran Khan's PTI retains massive popular support despite suppression; 63% of under-30s supported PTI in 2024 polling
- Balochistan and KPK insurgencies are intensifying, stretching military resources
- The economy cannot sustain both IMF austerity and expanding security expenditure
- International isolation risk: Pakistan's human rights record could trigger sanctions or aid conditionality
Historical precedent: Iran's January 2026 crackdown (30,000+ estimated deaths) shows how security force impunity can accelerate rather than prevent instability. Pakistan's 1971 breakdown — where military atrocities in East Pakistan led to the creation of Bangladesh — remains the ultimate cautionary tale.
Trigger: Economic shock (currency crisis, IMF program collapse) combined with a renewed PTI protest movement.
Chapter 6: Investment Implications
Pakistan-specific risks:
- Pakistan Stock Exchange (KSE-100) has rallied 80% since 2023 lows on IMF program optimism, but the governance crisis creates significant downside risk
- CPEC projects face double jeopardy: BLA attacks + governance instability
- International bond spreads (PAKIST 2031) currently at ~650bps could widen sharply on political crisis
- Foreign direct investment, already minimal at $1.5B/year, faces further deterrence
Regional spillover:
- India's security establishment will cite Pakistan instability to justify defense spending increases (Rafale deal, naval expansion)
- China's CPEC investment ($62B committed) faces rising risk, potentially accelerating Beijing's pivot to alternative corridors (Iran, Central Asia)
- Afghanistan border crisis could intensify refugee flows into Iran and Central Asia
Sector implications:
- Defense/security stocks in India (HAL, BEL, Bharat Dynamics) benefit from Pakistan instability narrative
- Pakistani textile exports ($18B) could face ESG-driven supply chain scrutiny if human rights crisis intensifies
- Gulf state labor markets may see increased Pakistani migration, affecting remittance flows ($30B/year, Pakistan's largest foreign exchange source)
Conclusion
Pakistan's Crime Control Department has killed more people in eight months than many armed conflicts. The 462:1 casualty ratio — 924 suspects killed versus two officers — does not describe law enforcement. It describes a systematic killing program operating under the thin veneer of crime control.
The HRCP's characterization of the CCD as implementing a "systemic policy of extrajudicial killing" places Pakistan alongside the Philippines, Egypt, and El Salvador in the growing roster of states that have chosen extrajudicial violence as a governance strategy. But Pakistan is unique among them: it is the world's fifth most populous country, a nuclear weapons state, and a recipient of billions in Western and Chinese investment premised on the assumption of institutional stability.
The international community faces an uncomfortable question: at what point does the normalization of state-sanctioned killing in a nuclear-armed state of 250 million people become a global security issue rather than a domestic law enforcement matter?
The HRCP has called for a province-wide moratorium on encounter operations and the establishment of an independent civilian police oversight commission. Whether anyone in power is listening remains an open question. As Zubaida Bibi's family discovered, in Punjab today, the police do not just enforce the law — they are the law. And that law permits killing.
Sources: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) fact-finding report, February 17, 2026; Al Jazeera; Pakistan Today; The Express Tribune; HRCP annual State of Human Rights reports; IMF Pakistan program documents.
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