On February 9, 2026, Bangladesh's interim government will sign a trade agreement with the United States in Washington. Concluded under a non-disclosure agreement just 72 hours before the national election, this deal is more than a simple tariff negotiation—it marks a decisive moment where America's China containment strategy extends into South Asia.
Chapter 1. The 72-Hour Mystery
On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh holds its first general election since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Yet three days before that, on February 9, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus is pushing ahead with signing a trade agreement with the United States.
The most shocking aspect of this agreement is its secrecy. Both countries signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) in 2025, and the contents have not been revealed to Bangladesh's parliament or even the garment export industry—the sector most directly affected. It is unprecedented for a trade deal to be protected by an NDA.
Commerce Adviser Sk Bashir Uddin has already signed the agreement documents in Dhaka, and a five-member delegation departed for Washington on February 6 to attend the signing ceremony with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Neither the Commerce Adviser nor the Commerce Secretary are traveling to the US—an unusual arrangement.
Why such urgency?
The answer lies in February 2. President Donald Trump announced the India-US trade agreement following a phone call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The key element: reducing US tariffs on Indian goods from 50% (effective rate 25%) to 18%.
For Bangladesh, this was tantamount to an economic death sentence. Between 80-90% of Bangladesh's exports are garments (Ready-Made Garments, RMG), and the US is its largest export market. As of 2023, garment exports totaled $38 billion, with $7-8.4 billion going to the US alone. Four to five million workers, mostly women, are employed in this industry.
With India securing 18% tariffs while Bangladesh remains at 20%, Bangladesh cannot compete on price. Dhaka wants at minimum 15%—preferably lower than India.
Chapter 2. The Known Conditions: A Blade Aimed at China
Though the agreement is confidential, its contours have emerged through Indian media and Bangladesh's Prothom Alo. The conditions demanded by the US go far beyond simple trade liberalization.
First, reduce imports from China. Washington has demanded that Dhaka cut imports of Chinese products. Given that China is Bangladesh's largest supplier of industrial raw materials, this means supply chain restructuring. Much of the garment industry's fabric, accessories, and machinery comes from China.
Second, increase purchases of US military equipment. Bangladesh has traditionally procured military equipment from China and Russia. The US wants entry into this market—also a signal of security cooperation.
Third, unconditional market access for US products. US products must enter Bangladesh freely, and Bangladesh must accept US standards and certifications without independent verification.
Fourth, US vehicles enter without inspection. American automobiles and parts can enter Bangladesh without inspection.
Fifth, e-commerce tariff moratorium. Protecting US corporate interests in digital trade.
Sixth, strengthened intellectual property rights. Stricter IP laws could raise medicine prices, critics warn.
On tariffs, Bangladesh was hit with 37% reciprocal tariffs in April 2025, negotiated down to 35%, then 20% by August. This agreement is expected to lower them further to 15%.
Chapter 3. Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy
The fundamental question surrounding this agreement is: who is signing it?
Muhammad Yunus's interim government is not an elected government. It was established after the collapse of Sheikh Hasina's regime following student protests in August 2024. Its mandate is to conduct fair elections and transfer power to an elected government.
Is it appropriate to sign a trade agreement that will define the country's economic direction for years—three days before an election?
Debapriya Bhattacharya of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) noted: "If it had been signed after the election, political parties could have discussed it. We should consider whether this ties the hands of the incoming elected government."
Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry President Taskeen Ahmed said: "It's impossible to assess the impacts when the contents are unclear. Such an agreement should have been signed by a government elected by the people."
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) Vice President Inamul Haque Khan criticized: "I was surprised to see the signing come just three days before the election. This carries major implications and should have been done after the election."
Sajeeb Wazed, son of ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, went further, characterizing this election as a "sham election" designed to install a weak government aligned with foreign interests, alleging that the interim administration operates "in a completely non-transparent manner."
Chapter 4. The Garment Industry's Fear
Bangladesh's garment industry is already in crisis. Global demand slowdown, wage disputes, and rising raw material prices have converged. Trump administration tariffs have added to the pressure, leaving exporters worried about survival.
The situation worsened after the India-US deal. Indian textile industries in Gurugram and Faridabad are celebrating "new opportunities." India's textile minister has predicted "significant increases in garment exports."
Bangladeshi exporters fear two things.
First, US orders moving to India. Even if the tariff gap narrows, India may prevail on infrastructure, scale, and diversity.
Second, unknown burdens from hidden conditions. Because of the NDA, they cannot know what obligations the agreement imposes. If Chinese raw material import restrictions materialize, supply chain costs could skyrocket.
MIT Technology Review recently covered Bangladesh's garment industry greening efforts, but such long-term investments may become meaningless in the face of short-term survival challenges.
Chapter 5. A New Proxy War Front
The true significance of this agreement lies beyond trade.
As US-China trade tensions escalated in 2025, the US has pursued a multi-pronged strategy to reduce China dependence. It has cultivated Southeast Asian countries as alternative supply chains, built critical mineral alliances, and controlled high-tech exports.
Now that front is extending to South Asia.
India is already a US strategic partner—a Quad member and key pillar of China containment. The India-US trade deal deepens this relationship economically.
Bangladesh was in a different position. It has received Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment from China, and Sheikh Hasina's government tried to balance between India and China. China is Bangladesh's largest import source and major infrastructure investor.
US conditions—reducing Chinese imports, buying US military equipment—clearly aim to pry Bangladesh away from China. The Week characterized this as "a new proxy war."
The question is whether Bangladesh can afford this choice.
China is Bangladesh's largest supplier of industrial raw materials. Much of the garment industry's fabric, accessories, and machinery comes from China. Building alternative supply chains in the short term is difficult.
There is also the possibility of Chinese retaliation. After US tariffs in 2025, China's exports to Africa rose 26% while exports to the US fell 33%. China has the capacity to diversify markets. If Bangladesh alienates China, China could easily turn its back.
Chapter 6. After February 12: Scenario Analysis
The agreement will be signed on February 9, but implementation falls to whichever government takes office after the February 12 election. Three scenarios can be envisioned.
Scenario A: Pro-US Government Established (Probability 45%)
A government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) takes office and largely implements the Yunus administration's agreement. It gradually reduces China dependence and strengthens security cooperation with the US.
Rationale: BNP is traditionally pro-Western and, unlike the Awami League (Sheikh Hasina's party), has a less close relationship with China. Multiple signals suggest the US prefers BNP.
Triggers: Clear BNP victory, cooperation from coalition partners (especially Jamaat-e-Islami).
Scenario B: Agreement Renegotiation (Probability 35%)
The new government demands renegotiation of some conditions, particularly Chinese import restrictions. Friction with the US develops, but tariff reductions are maintained.
Rationale: No government can completely sever relations with China. Supply chain realities compel this. There may also be political backlash against an agreement made by an unelected government.
Triggers: Domestic nationalist pressure on the new government, Chinese economic retaliation threats.
Scenario C: Agreement Suspended (Probability 20%)
The new government challenges the agreement's legitimacy and suspends its effect. US-Bangladesh relations deteriorate and tariffs rise again.
Rationale: The logic that an interim government without democratic legitimacy concluded the agreement. However, with the garment industry's survival at stake, this choice borders on self-harm.
Triggers: Rise of unexpected political forces, extreme nationalist sentiment.
Conclusion: A Choice Without Choice
Bangladesh's dilemma is that it has almost no room to maneuver.
With India securing 18% tariffs, if Bangladesh remains at 20%, its largest industry—garment exports—takes a hit. Over four million jobs are at stake. To secure 15% tariffs, it must accept US conditions.
But US conditions mean deteriorating relations with China. China is Bangladesh's largest raw material supplier and infrastructure investor. Damaging this relationship incurs long-term costs.
More fundamentally, the question remains: is it legitimate for an unelected government to determine a nation's economic direction?
The Yunus interim government says "there is nothing against the national interest." But does an interim government have the authority to judge what the national interest is? With the agreement's contents undisclosed, who can verify this?
On February 12, Bangladeshi voters will stand before their ballots. But three days before they choose, their economic future will already have been signed in Washington.
This article was written based on publicly available information as of February 7, 2026.
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